Against an inferentialist dogma

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


I consider the ‘inferentialist’ thesis that whenever a mental state rationally justifies a belief it is in virtue of inferential relations holding between the contents of the two states. I suggest that no good argument has yet been given for the thesis. I focus in particular on Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, 2000) and Ginsborg (Reasons for belief, 2011) and show that neither provides us with a reason to deny the plausible idea that experience can provide non-inferential justification for belief. I finish by pointing out some theoretical costs and tensions associated with endorsing inferentialism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1397-1421
Number of pages25
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Apr 1 2017
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • General Social Sciences


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