An argument for permissivism from safespots

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

11 Citations (Scopus)


I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on ‘Safespot’ propositions – i.e. a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on the following plausible principle: If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle – viz. opposition to ‘epistemic consequentialism’ – is briefly discussed.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLogic, Rationality, and Interaction - 5th International Workshop, LORI 2015, Proceedings
EditorsWen-Fang Wang, Wiebe van der Hoek, Wesley H. Holliday
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9783662485606
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes
Event5th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2015 - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
Duration: Oct 28 2015Oct 31 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference5th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2015
Country/TerritoryTaiwan, Province of China


  • Belief
  • Blindspots
  • Epistemic consequentialism
  • Epistemology
  • Evidence
  • Permissivism
  • Philosophy
  • Rationality
  • Uniqueness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science


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