Abstract
I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on 'Safespot' propositions-i.e., a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle (roughly stated): If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle-viz opposition to 'epistemic consequentialism'-is briefly discussed. The principle is extended to cover degrees of belief and compared with a couple of other well-known constraints on rational degrees of belief.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 327-346 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 67 |
Issue number | 267 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 1 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Belief
- Blindspots
- Credence
- Epistemic consequentialism
- Epistemology
- Permissivism
- Philosophy
- Rationality
- Uniqueness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy