Another argument against uniqueness

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19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I present an argument against the thesis of Uniqueness and in favour of Permissivism. Counterexamples to Uniqueness are provided, based on 'Safespot' propositions-i.e., a proposition that is guaranteed to be true provided the subject adopts a certain attitude towards it. The argument relies on a plausible principle (roughly stated): If S knows that her believing p would be a true belief, then it is rationally permitted for S to believe p. One motivation for denying this principle-viz opposition to 'epistemic consequentialism'-is briefly discussed. The principle is extended to cover degrees of belief and compared with a couple of other well-known constraints on rational degrees of belief.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)327-346
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Volume67
Issue number267
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 1 2017
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Belief
  • Blindspots
  • Credence
  • Epistemic consequentialism
  • Epistemology
  • Permissivism
  • Philosophy
  • Rationality
  • Uniqueness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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