Abstract
This paper analyzes how a ‘new’ performance management system was developed by the Thailand Government. The data were collected using interviews, archival records and published newspaper articles. These data were analyzed using the lenses of institutional theory, especially agentic institutionalism. We reveal how a performance management system was developed over four stages, with each stage facing different institutional pressures. The study makes two contributions. Firstly, it demonstrates how different phases of development of a performance management system are influenced by different institutional pressures and how these pressures interact to bring about change. Secondly, the study illuminates the discursive and non-discursive strategies used by agents in a highly institutionalized environment in order to develop the system and gain legitimacy for it. The study complements recent interest from neo-institutional theory to understand how agents emerge from their embedded state to contribute to changing institutions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 26-44 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Critical Perspectives on Accounting |
| Volume | 40 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 1 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Balanced Scorecard
- Performance management
- Public sector
- Thailand
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Sociology and Political Science
- Finance
- Information Systems and Management
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In: Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 40, 01.10.2016, p. 26-44.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Development of a performance management system in the Thailand public sector
T2 - Isomorphism and the role and strategies of institutional entrepreneurs
AU - Sutheewasinnon, Prapaipim
AU - Hoque, Zahirul
AU - Nyamori, Robert Ochoki
N1 - Funding Information: Failure by the Office of Civil Service Commission to assume the effective role of an organizational entrepreneur was followed by establishment of the Office of Public Sector Development Commission in late 2002. This Commission was established as a non-departmental government body under the Office of the Prime Minister with responsibility as the main host for the development of the Thai bureaucracy. The Office of Public Sector Development Commission was made directly accountable to the Prime Minister and kept separate from the government's Public Sector Reform Committee. The Office of Public Sector Development Commission took over responsibility for developing performance management in the Thai public sector. The establishment of this office is interpreted as marking the emergence of an effective institutional entrepreneur. The Office of Public Sector Development Commission was established to support public sector development and undertake other government duties including study, research, monitoring and evaluation of ministries. The other functions included dissemination of data and knowledge, organization of training programs, reporting of data and results, as well as recommending strategic plans and other actions. The goal of the Office of Public Sector Development Commission is “to create networks and cooperate with other organizations and institutions at all levels, performing only necessary tasks. In addition, the Office will seek to collaborate with organizations and institutions both inside and outside the country to achieve sustainable and continuous public sector development” ( www.OPDC.go.th ). The Office of Public Sector Development Commission conducted its functions through eight internal units namely: Monitoring and Evaluation, Dissemination and Public Participation, Public Sector Restructuring, Regional Administration Development, Legal Bureau, Office of Secretary General, Research and Development, and the Institute for Promotion of Good Governance ( Office of Public Sector Development Commission, 2004a ). It sought to discharge these functions by creating cooperative networks with other organizations and institutions in Thailand (at all levels) and outside the country to achieve sustainable and continuous public sector development. We interpret this requirement to cooperate and build networks as providing avenues through which institutional pressures will enter the Thai public sector ( DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991 ). We suggest the Office of Public Sector Development Commission as institutional entrepreneur would exercise a level of control through which institutional pressures came to exercise influence in the organization ( Covaleski et al., 2013 ). Moreover, in each government agency a new unit was established to represent the Office of Public Sector Development Commission and convey knowledge and instructions from the Office of Public Sector Development Commission. This unit was also tasked with monitoring and evaluating the performance of its own department and collecting all the documents to be submitted to the Office of Public Sector Development Commission. These new units came to be colloquially known as “Office of Public Sector Development Commission junior”. We interpret the establishment of the “Office of Public Sector Development Commission juniors” as an attempt to extend the institutional entrepreneur's influence throughout the Thai public sector through installing partner entrepreneurs within individual departments ( Battilana et al., 2009 ). The Office of Public Sector Development Commission embarked on this mission by hiring Dr. Tosaporn Sirisampan in 2002, lecturer in Political Science at the highly regarded Chulalongkorn University. As the Secretary-General of Office of Public Sector Development Commission his influence spread throughout the Office of Public Sector Development Commission and Thai government bodies. According to interviewees and internal management reports, Dr. Tosaporn was considered the expert in organizational reform, especially NPM. He published the book The New Public Administration: Context and Techniques which is widely read in Thai academia and the Thai public sector. Relating to this, one interviewee commented that “Dr. Tosaporn is the key main actor to initiate the new idea [new performance measurement]”. We suggest that his credentials provided an important source of social capital for the development of the Performance Agreement Framework (cf. Battilana et al., 2009 ). The Office of Public Sector Development Commission's hand was strengthened to pursue development of a new performance management system through codification of such a new regime into law. This codification of changes to evaluation procedures occurred in 2003 when the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedure for Good Governance B.E. 2546 (2003) was enacted. Section 12 of that Royal Decree required the following: The government agency shall establish, under the rule, procedure and period as specified by Office of Public Sector Development Commission, an independent inspection committee, in order to evaluate the performance of duty of the government agency related to the result of the mission, quality of service, pleasure of customers and value for money. The Decree required all Thai public agencies to take responsibility for measuring the results of their actions to promote governmental efficiency and effectiveness through improving performance measurement. We interpret this codification as conferring immense powers on the institutional entrepreneurs to develop a performance management system and diffuse it throughout the Thai public sector ( Battilana et al., 2009 ). The Office of Public Sector Development Commission played a key role as an institutional actor ( DiMaggio, 1988 ) in persuading government agencies that implementing the Balanced Scorecard concept in the Thai public sector would benefit both the agencies and the public. We will revisit how this important actor sought to persuade members of the Thai bureaucracy and the Thai public that development of the PA was necessary in Section 6 . This stage of our analysis reveals how the Government decided that to bring about effective development of a new performance management system, it needed to install an effective entrepreneur and then codify its position in law. The main isomorphic pressures at this point were emanating from the institutional entrepreneur and the coercive forces of the law. The institutional entrepreneur was able to exercise coercive powers over Government departments by virtue of this law and from the agency of Dr Tosaporn who had glowing credentials from the university sector. The organizational entrepreneur sought to extend its reach through installation of “junior” entrepreneurs throughout the Thai public service. 5.3 Publisher Copyright: © 2015
PY - 2016/10/1
Y1 - 2016/10/1
N2 - This paper analyzes how a ‘new’ performance management system was developed by the Thailand Government. The data were collected using interviews, archival records and published newspaper articles. These data were analyzed using the lenses of institutional theory, especially agentic institutionalism. We reveal how a performance management system was developed over four stages, with each stage facing different institutional pressures. The study makes two contributions. Firstly, it demonstrates how different phases of development of a performance management system are influenced by different institutional pressures and how these pressures interact to bring about change. Secondly, the study illuminates the discursive and non-discursive strategies used by agents in a highly institutionalized environment in order to develop the system and gain legitimacy for it. The study complements recent interest from neo-institutional theory to understand how agents emerge from their embedded state to contribute to changing institutions.
AB - This paper analyzes how a ‘new’ performance management system was developed by the Thailand Government. The data were collected using interviews, archival records and published newspaper articles. These data were analyzed using the lenses of institutional theory, especially agentic institutionalism. We reveal how a performance management system was developed over four stages, with each stage facing different institutional pressures. The study makes two contributions. Firstly, it demonstrates how different phases of development of a performance management system are influenced by different institutional pressures and how these pressures interact to bring about change. Secondly, the study illuminates the discursive and non-discursive strategies used by agents in a highly institutionalized environment in order to develop the system and gain legitimacy for it. The study complements recent interest from neo-institutional theory to understand how agents emerge from their embedded state to contribute to changing institutions.
KW - Balanced Scorecard
KW - Performance management
KW - Public sector
KW - Thailand
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84931064173&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84931064173&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.cpa.2015.06.002
DO - 10.1016/j.cpa.2015.06.002
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84931064173
SN - 1045-2354
VL - 40
SP - 26
EP - 44
JO - Critical Perspectives on Accounting
JF - Critical Perspectives on Accounting
ER -