Emotion as patheception

Raja Bahlul

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    2 Citations (Scopus)


    Emotions cannot be fully understood in purely cognitive terms. Nor can they be fully understood as mere feelings with no content. But it has not been easy to give an account of the relation of affect and cognition in a way that preserves the perceived unity of emotional experience. Consequently, emotion theories tend to lean either toward cognitivism, or, alternatively, the view that emotions are basically non-cognitive affairs. The aim of this paper is to argue for an account of emotion as a unity of affect and cognition. Emotions, it will be suggested, do not combine, blend, add, or causally relate cognition to affect, or affect to cognition, but are rather original unities which should be viewed as coordinate with, rather than subordinate to, either cognition, perception, feeling, or any other basic mental category.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)104-122
    Number of pages19
    JournalPhilosophical Explorations
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - Jan 2 2015


    • Affect
    • cognition
    • emotion
    • feeling
    • judgment
    • patheception
    • perception
    • representation

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Philosophy


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