Abstract
We propose a technique for defeating signature-based malware detectors by exploiting information disclosed by antivirus interfaces. This information is leveraged to reverse engineer relevant details of the detector's underlying signature database, revealing binary obfuscations that suffice to conceal malware from the detector. Experiments with real malware and antivirus interfaces on Windows operating systems justify the effectiveness of our approach.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1182-1189 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Computer Standards and Interfaces |
Volume | 31 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2009 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Binary obfuscation
- Data mining
- Security
- Signature-based malware detection
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Hardware and Architecture
- Law