TY - JOUR
T1 - Holes Cannot Be Counted as Immaterial Objects
AU - Meadows, Phillip John
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
PY - 2015/8/1
Y1 - 2015/8/1
N2 - In this paper I argue that the theory that holes are immaterial objects faces an objection that has traditionally been thought to be the principal difficulty with its main rival, which construes holes as material parts of material objects. Consequently, one of the principal advantages of identifying holes with immaterial objects is illusory: its apparent ease of accounting for truths about number of holes. I argue that in spite of this we should not think of holes as material parts of material objects. This is because the theory that holes are properties does not face the same difficulties as either of these theories that construe holes as objects of some sort.
AB - In this paper I argue that the theory that holes are immaterial objects faces an objection that has traditionally been thought to be the principal difficulty with its main rival, which construes holes as material parts of material objects. Consequently, one of the principal advantages of identifying holes with immaterial objects is illusory: its apparent ease of accounting for truths about number of holes. I argue that in spite of this we should not think of holes as material parts of material objects. This is because the theory that holes are properties does not face the same difficulties as either of these theories that construe holes as objects of some sort.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84940724861&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84940724861&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10670-014-9676-z
DO - 10.1007/s10670-014-9676-z
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84940724861
SN - 0165-0106
VL - 80
SP - 841
EP - 852
JO - Erkenntnis
JF - Erkenntnis
IS - 4
ER -