Industry tournament incentives and differential risk taking

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This study examines how industry tournament incentives affect chief executive officers' (CEOs') attitudes toward differential risk-taking. The results show that these incentives cause a greater increase in taking systematic rather than idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, this differential risk-taking manifests in a competitive business environment. The findings hold robust to the instrumental variable approach and variation in industry pay gap following the adoption of FAS123R. Overall, the results suggest that the industry pay gap effectively increases CEOs' systematic risk-taking, especially in competitive industries.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)219-241
Number of pages23
JournalReview of Financial Economics
Volume41
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2023
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • CEO incentives
  • idiosyncratic risk
  • industry tournament incentives
  • product market competition
  • risk-taking
  • systematic risk

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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