Abstract
Trenton Merricks has argued that given endurantism personal identity is unanalysable in terms of psychological continuity, while Anthony Brueckner has argued against this claim. This article shows that neither philosopher has made a compelling case and also shows what it would take to settle the issue either way. It is then argued that whether personal identity is analysable or not may not be of crucial importance to those wanting to defend a psychological continuity approach to personal identity.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 309-316 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Acta Analytica |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 1 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Endurantism
- Personal identity
- Psychological continuity theory
- Trenton Merricks
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy