Knowledge judgements and cognitive psychology

Simon Langford

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1880-y

Knowledge judgements and cognitive psychology

Simon Langford

Department of Cognitive Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Separately, and in quite different ways, Mikkel Gerken and Jennifer Nagel have attempted to defend moderate classical invariantism (MCI) by appealing to recent work in cognitive psychology. They claim that by understanding the psychological processing that underlies our knowledge judgements, we can reconcile their apparent shiftiness with traditional non-shifty epistemology. The aim of this paper is to show how and why these attempts to exploit work in cognitive psychology to defend MCI run aground.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	3245-3259
Number of pages	15
Journal	Synthese
Volume	197
Issue number	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1880-y
Publication status	Published - Aug 1 2020

Keywords

Epistemic invariantism
Jennifer Nagel
Knowledge ascriptions
Mikkel Gerken
Psychological bias

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy
Social Sciences(all)

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10.1007/s11229-018-1880-y

Cite this

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AB - Separately, and in quite different ways, Mikkel Gerken and Jennifer Nagel have attempted to defend moderate classical invariantism (MCI) by appealing to recent work in cognitive psychology. They claim that by understanding the psychological processing that underlies our knowledge judgements, we can reconcile their apparent shiftiness with traditional non-shifty epistemology. The aim of this paper is to show how and why these attempts to exploit work in cognitive psychology to defend MCI run aground.

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Knowledge judgements and cognitive psychology

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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