TY - JOUR
T1 - On the nature of indifferent lies, a reply to Rutschmann and Wiegmann
AU - Krstić, Vladimir
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2020/7/3
Y1 - 2020/7/3
N2 - In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are either intended to deceive or are not lies at all, since they do not involve genuine assertions.
AB - In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are either intended to deceive or are not lies at all, since they do not involve genuine assertions.
KW - asserting
KW - communication
KW - deception
KW - insincerity
KW - intention to deceive
KW - Lying
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U2 - 10.1080/09515089.2020.1743255
DO - 10.1080/09515089.2020.1743255
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85082432855
SN - 0951-5089
VL - 33
SP - 757
EP - 771
JO - Philosophical Psychology
JF - Philosophical Psychology
IS - 5
ER -