TY - JOUR
T1 - On the Possibility of Knowledge through Unsafe Testimony
AU - Madison, B. J.C.
N1 - Funding Information:
Thanks to Michael Brent, Constantine Sandis, and Alex Steinberg for helpful discussion. Thanks also to an audience at Lingnan University, Hong Kong for beneficial comments and questions (in particular, I recall helpful comments from Dan Marshall, Darrell Rowbottom and Bryan Frances). Thanks especially to (multiple) anonymous referees, Axel Gelfert, Guy Longworth, John Greco, and Rhiannon James for encouragement and helpful written comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2020/9/2
Y1 - 2020/9/2
N2 - If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that the hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Sanford Goldberg argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Jennifer Lackey and Charlie Pelling criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on to provide his own example that attempts to show that Goldberg’s thesis is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. If any of these counterexamples were correct, they would undermine the main reason to think that knowledge based on unsafe testimony is impossible. My aim in this paper is to critically assess these arguments, and to consider the possibility of knowledge through unsafe testimony. Drawing a general moral from the analysis of these cases, I shall contend that it is impossible to acquire safe belief solely on the basis of unsafe testimony. If so, then testimonial knowledge based solely on unsafe testimony is impossible.
AB - If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that the hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Sanford Goldberg argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Jennifer Lackey and Charlie Pelling criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on to provide his own example that attempts to show that Goldberg’s thesis is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. If any of these counterexamples were correct, they would undermine the main reason to think that knowledge based on unsafe testimony is impossible. My aim in this paper is to critically assess these arguments, and to consider the possibility of knowledge through unsafe testimony. Drawing a general moral from the analysis of these cases, I shall contend that it is impossible to acquire safe belief solely on the basis of unsafe testimony. If so, then testimonial knowledge based solely on unsafe testimony is impossible.
KW - Knowledge
KW - safety
KW - testimony
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U2 - 10.1080/02691728.2020.1747117
DO - 10.1080/02691728.2020.1747117
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85083677876
SN - 0269-1728
VL - 34
SP - 513
EP - 526
JO - Social Epistemology
JF - Social Epistemology
IS - 5
ER -