Ontological accounting and aboutness: on Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking

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5 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, I first present an overview of Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking, highlighting what I take to be some of its most attractive features, especially his re-invigoration of the ontological understanding of truthmaking and his defence of ontology-first truthmaking over explanation-first truthmaking. Then, I articulate what I take to be a puzzling potential inconsistency: (a) he appeals to considerations to do with aboutness in criticising how well ontological views account for truth while (b) ruling out aboutness from the right account of truthmaking. He argues, instead, that necessitation is both necessary and sufficient for truthmaking (§3.3). I suggest that adding aboutness to one’s account in the right way is not just compatible with but important for ontology-first truthmaking. I do all this to invite Asay to clarify his position on these matters. Overall, Asay’s worldview displays the fruitfulness of an ontologically serious approach to metaphysics that puts truthmaking centre-stage.

Original languageEnglish
Article number1
JournalAsian Journal of Philosophy
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2022
Externally publishedYes


  • A Theory of Truthmaking
  • Aboutness
  • Jamin Asay
  • Ontological accounting
  • Truthmaking

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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