Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief

Thomas Raleigh, Filippo Vindrola

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


According to the recent Perceptual Confidence view, perceptual experiences possess not only a representational content, but also a degree of confidence in that content. The motivations for this view are partly phenomenological and partly epistemic. We discuss both the phenomenological and epistemic motivations for the view, and the resulting account of the interface between perceptual experiences and degrees of belief. We conclude that, in their present state of development, orthodox accounts of perceptual experience are still to be favoured over the perceptual confidence view.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)378-406
Number of pages29
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Apr 1 2021


  • epistemology
  • justification
  • perceptual confidence
  • perceptual experience
  • philosophy of mind & cognitive science

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


Dive into the research topics of 'Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this