The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests

Hao Jia, Ching jen Sun

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


We analyze a three-stage game where an organizer sets an entry fee for a Tullock contest event, and a finite population of homogeneous agents simultaneously decide whether to participate or not. We show that in the unique symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the larger the population size, the lower the probability the agents enter the contest, but the organizer's optimal entry fee-prize ratio could either increase or decrease with the population size. When the population size approaches infinity, the number of contestants converges to a Poisson distributed random variable.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102515
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2021
Externally publishedYes


  • Contest success function
  • Endogenous entry
  • Optimal entry fee-prize ratio
  • Uncertain number of contestants

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics


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