Tolerant enactivist cognitive science

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


Enactivist (Embodied, Embedded, etc.) approaches in cognitive science and philosophy of mind are sometimes, though not always, conjoined with an anti-representational commitment. A weaker anti-representational claim is that ascribing representational content to internal/sub-personal processes is not compulsory when giving psychological explanations. A stronger anti-representational claim is that the very idea of ascribing representational content to internal, sub-personal processes is a theoretical confusion. This paper criticises some of the arguments made by Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) for the stronger anti-representational claim and suggests that the default Enactivist view should be the weaker non-representational position.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)226-244
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophical Explorations
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - May 4 2018
Externally publishedYes


  • embodied cognition
  • enactivism
  • extended mind
  • imagination
  • intentionality
  • representational content
  • teleo-semantics
  • verbal disputes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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