Two anti-platonist strategies

Chris Daly, Simon Langford

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


This paper considers two strategies for undermining indispensability arguments for mathematical Platonism. We defend one strategy (the Trivial Strategy) against a criticism by Joseph Melia. In particular, we argue that the key example Melia uses against the Trivial Strategy fails. We then criticize Melia's chosen strategy (the Weaseling Strategy.) The Weaseling Strategy attempts to show that it is not always inconsistent or irrational knowingly to assert p and deny an implication of p. We argue that Melia's case for this strategy fails.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1107-1116
Number of pages10
Issue number476
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2010
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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