Types, forms, and unity: Wittgenstein's criticism of russell's theory of judgment

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)


    This paper investigates Wittgenstein's "notorious" criticism of Russell's theory of judgment. Instead of advancing a further new interpretation of it, though, I analyze and discuss some of the most promising readings of the Russell/Wittgenstein dispute put forward in the secondary literature; I aim to show that, despite their alleged reciprocal opposition, they cohere with each other because they are, at bottom, different ways of highlighting the same question. I then connect Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell to the account of the nature of the proposition presented in the Tractatus, arguing that the latter can be seen as a natural development of the former. Finally, I make a quick connection between Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell and the conception of the world as the totality of facts, as presented in the Tractatus.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)177-193
    Number of pages17
    JournalHistory of Philosophy Quarterly
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2014

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Philosophy


    Dive into the research topics of 'Types, forms, and unity: Wittgenstein's criticism of russell's theory of judgment'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this